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CASENOTES

TORT LAW:

SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS

MINORS-Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St. 3d
112, 526 N.E.2d 798 (1988).

OF INTOXICATED

I.

INTRODUCTION

Few areas of tort law are as unsettled today as the liability of
social hosts for the negligent acts of their intoxicated guests.' At common law a cause of action did not lie against a social host who furnished liquor to a person who became intoxicated and subsequently
caused injury to a third party.' Some courts have abrogated this general rule in favor of sweeping social host liability premised upon common law negligence principles.' Other courts have been unwilling to
abandon the broad rule of non-liability of social hosts in the absence of
a statutory violation. 4 Courts, however, have been less reluctant to extend liability to social hosts when the intoxicated guest is a minor.5
I. See generally Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Negligent
Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 561 (1980); Heard, The Liability of Purveyors of Alcoholic Beverages for Torts of Intoxicated Consumers, 47 MONT. L. REV. 495 (1986);
Special Project, Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 1058 (1985); Comment, The Liability of Social Hosts for Their Intoxicated Guests'
Automobile Accidents - An Extension of the Law, 18 AKRON L. REV. 473 (1985)[hereinafter
Comment, Social Hosts]; Comment, Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When "One for
the Road Becomes One for the Courts," 29 VILL. L. REV. 1119 (1984); Note, Social Host Liability: Am I My Brother's Keeper?, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 351 (1985-86); Note, Social Host Liability for Guests Who Drink and Drive: A Closer Look at the Benefits and the Burdens, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 583 (1986).
2. For a detailed history of the common law immunity of social hosts, see Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983).
3. See Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88, 95, 540 A.2d 54, 58 (1988) (minor's consumption of
alcohol is not an intervening cause insulating a social host from liability based on common law
negligence principles); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548, 476 A.2d 1219, 1230 (1984) (imposing social host liability purely on common law negligence grounds) (superceded by statute).
4. See Walker v. Key, 101 N.M. 631, 636, 686 P.2d 973, 978 (1984) (violation of statute
prohibiting delivery of alcohol to minor by social host is negligence per se). But see United Serv.
Auto. Ass'n v. Butler, 359 So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla. 1978) (statute prohibiting selling, giving or
serving alcohol to minors does not create a cause of action against social host for injuries sustained
by one injured as a result of host's dispensing alcohol to minor).
5. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Orr, 130 Misc. 2d 807, 812-13, 498 N.Y.S.2d 968, 973 (1986)
(immunity of social host for serving alcohol to an adult guest does not apply to minors because
hosts can more readily refuse to serve alcohol to a minor than to an adult guest); Langle v.
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The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently expressed its reluctance
to extend the liability of social hosts for the negligent acts of those to
whom they serve intoxicating liquors where there is no duty imposed by
statute.' The court has declined to impose liability upon social hosts
based upon any common law duty owed by hosts to their guests or third
parties.7
The Ohio Supreme Court's reluctance to impose sweeping social
host liability was reiterated in Mitseff v. Wheeler,8 wherein the court
predicated the liability of a social host for the negligent acts of an intoxicated minor solely upon the violation of a criminal statute prohibiting the furnishing of intoxicating liquors to minors. 9 While the statute
at issue in Mitseff does not provide any civil remedy, 10 the court, without explanation, found such a remedy implicit in the statute." While
the Mitseff decision imposes liability upon social hosts only where a
statute has been violated, it may have broader implications, namely the
deterioration of common law social host immunity for the iegligent
acts of intoxicated guests. 2
This casenote will review the developments that have led to the
deterioration of common law social host immunity for the negligent
acts of their intoxicated minor guests. This casenote will also review the
resulting approaches to the expansion of social host liability,' 3 and the
historical development of social host liability in Ohio. Finally, the effect
the Mitseff decision is likely to have on social host liability in Ohio also
will be explored.

Kurkul, 146 Vt. 513, 521, 510 A.2d 1301, 1306 (1986) (court refused to impose social host liability where the intoxicated person was not a minor or when the person served was not visibly intoxicated and the host was not able to reasonably foresee that the guest would be driving an
automobile).
6. Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veterans Post, II Ohio St. 3d 123, 127, 464 N.E.2d 521, 524
(1984); Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 33, 294 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1973).
7. See cases cited supra note 6.
8. 38 Ohio St. 3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798 (1988).
9. Id. at 114, 526 N.E.2d at 800.
10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4301.69 (Anderson 1987).
11. Mitseff, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 113, 526 N.E.2d at 799. Similar criminal statutes in other
states have also been the vehicle for imposing liability upon social hosts for the subsequent negligent acts of minors to whom the hosts have furnished intoxicating beverages. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 3-3-23(a)(1) (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.141a (West 1968).
12. See generally Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987); Miller v. Moran, 96
Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1985);
Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
13. This casenote will not address the liability of dram shop operators. A dram shop is
defined as "a drinking establishment where liquors are sold to be drunk on the premises; a bar or
saloon." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (5th ed. 1979). See generally supra note 1.
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II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Mitseff v. Wheeler " was an action brought by the decedent's
spouse seeking damages for himself as surviving spouse, and for the
wrongful death of Kathryn Mitseff.' 5 The defendants were Douglas R.
Wheeler and William G. Jones (d.b.a. Reedurban Tavern). 1 6 Wheeler
furnished four bottles of beer to Jennifer Johnson, who Wheeler knew
to be seventeen years of age.' 7 At the time, the legal age at which a
person could consume beer in the State of Ohio was nineteen.1 8 Upon
leaving Wheeler's residence, Johnson was served more alcohol at the
Reedurban Tavern.' 9 Johnson departed the tavern and was involved in
an accident in which Kathryn Mitseff was killed.2 0
The plaintiff in Mitseff alleged that the defendants knowingly
served alcohol to Johnson, a minor.2 The plaintiff further alleged that
Johnson's consumption of alcohol "caused her to become intoxicated,
which, in turn, caused her to act in such a manner as to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to third persons." 2 2 Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the negligence of the defendants in furnishing intoxicating
beverages to Johnson was the proximate cause of Kathryn Mitseff's
death.2 The case was first tried before the Court of Common Pleas for
Stark County, Ohio.24 The common pleas court granted Wheeler's motion for summary judgment, without providing any reason for its decision.26 Wheeler based his motion upon the assertions that (1) a social
host who furnishes intoxicating beverages to guests is not liable to a
third party for injuries caused by the guest after leaving the host's
premises, and (2) the record was void of any evidence that the decedent's injuries were proximately caused by Wheeler's negligence. 6 The
Court of Appeals for Stark County affirmed the lower court's decision
without providing any interpretation of social host liability in Ohio. Instead, the appeals court determined that summary judgment was properly granted by the lower court because the plaintiff had not introduced

14. 38 Ohio St. 3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798 (1988).
15. id. at 112, 526 N.E.2d at 799.
16. Id. The issue of Jones' liability was not presented to the court in this appeal. Id. at 113,
526 N.E.2d at 799.
17. Id. at 112, 526 N.E.2d at 798-99.
18. Id. at 112, 526 N.E.2d at 799.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 112, 526 N.E.2d at 798.

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:2

any evidence to demonstrate that the minor's negligence had caused the
fatal accident. 27 The court of appeals certified the record of the case to
the Ohio Supreme Court for review.18 The supreme court reversed both
the court of appeals and the trial court decisions.2 9 The court held that
section 4301.69 of the Ohio Revised Code,3 0 which precludes the sale
or furnishing of beer or intoxicating liquor to a person under the age of
nineteen, creates both a duty that social hosts refrain from furnishing
alcohol to minors,3 1 and a resulting civil cause of action.
III. BACKGROUND
A.

Historical Development: Common Law Rule of Non-Liability

At common law no cause of action existed against one who furnished alcohol to an individual who subsequently became intoxicated
and, as a result of that voluntary intoxication, injured a third party. 2
The rationale behind the common law rule is that the proximate cause
of the injury is the consumption of intoxicating liquor, rather than the
furnishing of the liquor. 3 Thus, the common law rule provides no remedy for an injured person against a social host.34 While the common
law rule of absolute immunity of social hosts is rather harsh and incongruent with the trend of expanding tort liability, the rule continues to

27. Id. at 113, 526 N.E.2d at 799.
28. Id.
29. On the summary judgment issue, the Mitseff court held that by filing an affidavit in
opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, "[plaintiff] effectively raised a triable
issue of fact not susceptible to summary judgment." Id. at 116, 526 N.E.2d at 802.
30. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.69 (Anderson 1987). At the time of the accident in the
Mitseff case, §4301.69 of the Ohio Revised Code stated, in pertinent part:
No person shall sell intoxicating liquor to a person under the age of twenty-one years
or sell beer to a person under the age of nineteen, or buy intoxicating liquor for, or furnish
it to, a person under the age of twenty-one years, or buy beer for or furnish it to a person
under the age of nineteen, unless given by a physician in the regular line of his practice, or
by a parent or legal guardian.
Id.
31. Mitseff, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 114, 526 N.E.2d at 800.
32. See, e.g., Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 148, 470 A.2d 507, 510-11 (1983).
33. See Chastain v. Litton Sys., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 527, 530 (W.D.N.C. 1981) (social host
not liable because proximate cause of injuries was the voluntary consumption of alcohol, not the
furnishing thereof), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1106 (1983); Walker v. Kennedy, 338 N.W.2d 254, 255 (Minn. 1983) (social host not liable for
negligent acts of intoxicated minor guest since it was the minor's conduct, not the conduct of the
host, that caused the injury); Yoscovitch v. Wasson, 98 Nev. 250, 251, 645 P.2d 975, 976 (1982)
(proximate cause of injury is driver's consumption of liquor, rather than its sale). But see Powers
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 132 Misc. 2d 123, 127, 503 N.Y.S.2d 516, 519 (1986) (seller of
alcohol to minor not liable under common law negligence theory in that any duty under such a
theory does not extend beyond the physical area where supervision and control may reasonably be
exercised), modified, 129 A.D.2d 37, 516 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1987).
34. See supra note 33.
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be accepted by some courts.3 5
In Martin v. Watts, 36 the Alabama Supreme Court unequivocally
expressed its continued adherence to the common law rule of non-liability of social hosts for the negligent acts of their intoxicated guests. In
Martin, two minors became intoxicated after being served alcohol at a
Jaycees party and later skidded their vehicle into the path of the decedent's automobile. 37 The plaintiff brought an action against the individuals and against the organization who sponsored the party and which
furnished the intoxicating liquor to the minors, alleging liability based
upon the state's Dram Shop Act and common law negligence principles. 8 While the Alabama Supreme Court did impose liability on several of the defendants under the state's very broad Dram Shop Act, 9
the court held that a common law cause of action does not lie against
social hosts.4 0 Although the court in Martin had a statutory vehicle
through which to impose liability on those furnishing alcohol to minors,
it nonetheless refused to abolish the common law immunity of social
hosts for the negligent acts of their intoxicated guests."1
A unique variation of the continued viability of the common law
rule of absolute immunity of social hosts has been experienced in California. In the 1970's, a series of California Supreme Court decisions
abrogated the common law rule that the consumption of intoxicating
liquors, and not the furnishing thereof, was the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication."' In 1978, responding to the court's

35. See Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 108 II1. 2d 435, 443, 484 N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (1985) (applying both Wisconsin and Illinois law, the Illinois Supreme Court held that neither state recognized common law liability for the negligent sale of alcohol); Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d
468, 472 (Minn. 1985) (social host not liable to an injured third party in a common law action for
negligently serving alcohol to minor); Childress v. Sams, 736 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo. 1987) (minor
social host not liable on common law negligence grounds for negligent acts of minor guests to
whom host furnished liquor).
36. 508 So. 2d 1136 (Ala. 1987).
37. Id. at 1138.
38. Id. at 1136.
39. ALA. CODE § 6-5-71(a) (1975). The Alabama Dram Shop Act provides, in pertinent
part:
Every . . . person who shall be injured in person, property or means of support by an
intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person shall have a right of
action against any person who shall, by selling, giving or otherwise dispensing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication of
such person for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages.
Id.
40. Martin, 508 So. 2d at 1141.
41. Id. at 1141.
42. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978)
(supercede d by statute); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215 (superceded by statute), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153,
486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (superceded by statute).
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sweeping extension of social host liability in California, the California
legislature passed a statute which specifically contradicted the cases
which imposed liability on social hosts.4 s The statute essentially reinstated the common law rule that the consumption of alcohol is the
proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, and therefore,

social hosts are not liable for the negligent acts of their intoxicated
guests.""
Even when upholding the common law rule of non-liability, a
number of courts have expressed concern that the common law rule is

an anachronism in modern tort law."5 Some courts that have articulated doubts as to the continued application of the common law rule
have nonetheless adhered to it, arguing that it is the province of the
legislature to abrogate the rule."' In Bankston v. Brennan,4 the Florida

43. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1985). Section 25602 states, in pertinent
part:
(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away,
any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated
person is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be
sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this
section shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries
inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage. (c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the
holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernard v. Harrah's Club (16
Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Super. Court (21 Cal. 3d 144) be abrogated in favor of prior
judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an
intoxicated person.
Id.
44. For a detailed discussion of the California experience with social host liability see
Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1154-57, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 682-84 (1985). It must
be noted that the California courts have found that the sole explicit exception to social host immunity is the furnishing of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor. See De Bolt v. Kragen Auto
Supply, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 3d 269, 273, 227 Cal. Rptr. 258, 260 (1986).
45. See generally Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1987) (statute limiting
tort liability for person selling or furnishing alcoholic beverages to minors to those who willfully
and unlawfully sell such beverages does not create a cause of action against a social host who
served alcohol); United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Butler, 359 So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla. 1978) (declining to
find cause of action against social host for negligent serving of alcohol to minor); Ling v. Jan's
Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 639-41, 703 P.2d 731, 738-39 (1985) (no cause of action exists against
seller of liquor to a minor on theory that dispensing of liquor constituted direct wrong or actionable negligence, nor on the basis of statute prohibiting sale of liquor to minor); Holmquist v. Miller,
367 N.W.2d 468, 471-72 (Minn. 1985) (host not liable to an injured third party in a common law
action for negligently serving alcohol to minor).
46. See Miller v. Moran, 96 I11.App. 3d 596, 600-01, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1048-49 (1981) (if
liability of social hosts is to be created, it ought to be done by the legislature); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526, 529 (Miss. 1985) (even in light of strong public policy to discourage driving
under the influence of alcohol, the subject should be addressed by the legislature, particularly in
view of the problems inherent in a host attempting to control a guest); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb.
496, 504-05, 244 N.W.2d 65, 69-70 (1976) (social host liability is a policy matter which should
be left to the legislature); Yoscovitch v. Wasson, 98 Nev. 250, 251, 645 P.2d 975, 976 (1982) (if
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/8
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Supreme Court refused to impose liability on a social host on both
common law negligence principles as well as a very narrow tort statute.
Brennan, a minor, was served alcohol at a party and on his way home
collided his automobile with the plaintiff's vehicle.4 8 In very strong
dicta, the Bankston court noted that civil liability for a social host has
broad ramifications, and the prudent course for the judiciary to pursue
is to defer to legislative initiative.4 This deferential approach, while
calling into question the common law rule, nonetheless signals its continued application in the absence of legislative action imposing civil liability on those who serve intoxicating liquors to minors who subsequently injure third parties. Such an approach has credence, given that
judicial activism is a technique many courts choose not to practice.
B. Liability Premised Upon Common Law Negligence Principles
Given the modern tendency of courts to expand most areas of tort
liability, it was perhaps inevitable that some courts would opt for a
wholesale abrogation of the common law rule of non-liability of social
hosts for the negligent acts of their intoxicated guests.5" A cause of
action against a social host has generally evolved from the trend of
holding dram shop operators liable for the negligent acts of their intoxicated customers. 51 Statutes imposing liability on dram shop operators
have been passed in thirty-seven states at one time or another. 5 2 However, many of these statutes have been repealed.5 3 Further, dram shop
acts generally are not applicable to social hosts in a non-commercial
setting.54 Thus, many courts have been forced to rely on common law
civil liability is to be imposed on one who sells liquor to minor, it should be done by legislative act)
(citing Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969)). Cf. Holmquist v.
Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. 1985) (legislation rendering ineffective prior judicial decisions imposing social host liability is conclusive that there is no common law cause of action
against social hosts).
47. 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987).
48. Id. at 1386.
49. Id. at 1387.
50. See Nehring v. LaCounte, 712 P.2d 1329, 1335 (Mont. 1986) (abandoning common law
rule of immunity as a "Neanderthal approach to causation").
51. Comment, Social Hosts, supra note 1. The purpose of dram shop acts is to regulate and
control the primary source of hazardous intoxication - taverns and other licensees. The rationale
behind the dram shop acts is that the licensees benefit financially from furnishing alcohol, therefore, they should be the insurers of their customers' conduct. Special Project, supra note 1, at
1134. See also Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 440-41, 629 P.2d 8, 14, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 506
(1981) (limiting liability to commercial providers is reasonable in that such persons are experienced in business of selling liquor and can more readily detect the signs of intoxication and are in
a better position to defray the cost of liability than a typical social host) (superceded by statute).
52. Comment, Social Hosts, supra note 1, at 474.
53. Id.
54. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 III. App. 2d 412, 423, 199 N.E.2d 300, 306
(1964) by
(dram
shop act applicable
Published
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negligence principles and liquor control statute violations in order to
find social hosts liable for the negligent acts of their intoxicated
guests.55
In recent years courts have found that a cause of action exists,
based upon common law negligence grounds, for failure to exercise ordinary care in furnishing intoxicating beverages to minors. 56 The rationale for abandonment of the common law rule of non-liability was
57
aptly articulated by the New Jersey Superior Court in Linn v. Rand:
Our courts have not hesitated to place responsibility for tortious acts
upon the person committing the wrong, nor have they refrained from
removing old common law doctrines which granted immunity to wrongdoers. Why should a social host be given the special privilege of immu58
nity from liability if he acts negligently with resulting harm to others?
One court that imposed such liability held that one could be liable to a
third party for negligently furnishing alcohol to a minor when the alcohol was a substantial factor in causing the third party's injuries. 9
Other courts have premised liability upon the knowledge of the host
that the guest was a minor who had been consuming alcohol and who
would thereafter be driving a motor vehicle. 0 Thus, some courts"l have

Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 857, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1982) (dram shop act has no applicability
to a social host in a non-commercial setting).
55. See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322, 324-25 (7th Cir.
1959), cert denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1966); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 202, 156 A.2d 1, 9
(1959); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 347, 1465 A.2d 648, 651 (1958).
56. See Ely v. Murphy, 207 Conn. 88, 540 A.2d 54, 58 (1988) (minor's consumption of
alcohol is not an intervening cause which would insulate a social host from liability); McGuiggan
v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 398 Mass. 152, 160-61, 496 N.E.2d 141, 145 (1986) (recognizing a common law cause of action against social hosts based upon a policy concern of dealing with
drunk driving); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 219-20, 356 A.2d 15, 19 (1976) (social host
who serves excessive amounts of alcohol to visibly intoxicated minor liable for minor's negligent
acts); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 640, 485
P.2d 18, 22 (1971) ("[tjhere may be circumstances under which person could be held liable for
allowing another to become dangerously intoxicated"); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259,
265-66, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (1985).
57. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 217-18, 356 A.2d 15, 18 (1976).
58. Id.
59. Koback, 123 Wis. 2d at 276, 366 N.W.2d at 865 (social host who negligently serves or
furnishes alcohol to a minor who becomes intoxicated, or whose driving ability is impaired as a
result of the intoxicants, is liable to third persons for injuries in proportion to that negligence in
which furnishing beverage to a minor was a substantial factor in causing the injuries) (citing
Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (superceded by statute)).
60. See Linn, 140 N.J. Super. at 219-20, 356 A.2d at 19 (social host who serves alcohol to
a visibly intoxicated minor, knowing he will be driving on the public highways, will be held liable
for the minor's negligent acts); Wiener, 258 Or. at 643, 485 P.2d at 23 (social host who served
alcohol to minor liable when host should have known minor would be driving motor vehicle);
Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 376-77, 382 N.W.2d 673, 676 (1986) (social host liable
when he furnishes liquor to a minor knowing that minor would consume the liquor and minor
would be operating a motor vehicle). But see Bass v. Pratt, 177 Cal. App. 3d 129, 130, 222 Cal.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/8
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found the furnishing of the intoxicating liquor to minors to be the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
Imposing liability on social hosts who furnish intoxicating liquors
to minors appears to be less problematic for courts than extending liability to hosts for the negligent acts of their adult guests. Many courts
recognize a distinction between adult and minor guests.62 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Ely v. Murphy,6 3 succinctly expressed the logic
of maintaining the common law rule of non-liability as it applied to
adult guests, but found a cause of action grounded in common law negligence principles as applied to minors."' The Ely court stated:
The proposition that intoxication results from the voluntary conduct of
the person who consumes intoxicating liquor assumes a knowing and intelligent exercise of choice, and for that reason is more applicable to
adults than to minors. With respect to minors, various legislative enactments have placed them at a disability in the context of alcohol
65
consumption.
In Ely, the defendants were the hosts of a high school graduation
party where they furnished beer to those who attended the party. 6 The
guests ranged in age from fifteen to nineteen; the legal drinking age in
Connecticut at the time was nineteen. 7 The hosts did not monitor the
consumption of beer by their guests, nor did they determine whether

Rptr. 723, 728 (1986) (since statute provides immunity to social hosts, host could not be liable
unless he knowingly provided alcohol to one who was unable to resist consumption because of
some exceptional physical or mental condition; youth, by itself, is not such a condition). As the
principle applies to adult guests see Elsperman v. Plump, 446 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ind. App.
1983) (given the use of automobiles and increasing frequency of accidents involving drunk drivers,
the consequences of serving liquor to an intoxicated person are reasonably foreseeable); McGuiggan, 398 Mass. at 159-60, 496 N.E.2d at 145 (social host who did not have actual or reasonable
knowledge that adult guest is intoxicated is not liable to injured third parties).
61. See cases cited supra note 56; see also McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414
(Wyo. 1983) (ultimate test concerning proximate cause is the foreseeability of injury to a third
person).
62. See, e.g., Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 161, 470 A.2d 515, 517 (1983)
(distinguishing between adults and minors, court held minors are incompetent of handling the
effects of alcohol in the eyes of the law). But see Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 440, 656
P.2d 1030, 1033 (1982) (relevant inquiry is whether there has been a breach of a standard of care
and not whether the intoxicated tortfeasor is an adult or a minor).
63. 207 Conn. 88, 540 A.2d 54 (1988).
64. Id. at 88, 540 A.2d at 54. See also Montgomery v. Orr, 130 Misc. 2d 807, 812-13, 498
N.Y.S.2d 968, 973 (1986) (even though New York does not recognize a cause of action against a
social host for the negligent acts of intoxicated adult guests, a social host who serves alcohol to a
minor in violation of a statute may be held liable in common law negligence for injuries to third
parties).
65. Ely, 207 Conn. at 91, 540 A.2d at 57.
66. Id. at 89, 540 A.2d at 55.
67. by
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departing guests were fit to drive. 8 Foley, an eighteen year old guest at
the party, was seen staggering to his car; moments later he struck another guest with his vehicle, killing him.6 9 The Ely court recognized
that the Connecticut legislature had prohibited the furnishing of alcohol to minors and held that:
In view of the legislative determination that minors are incompetent to
assimilate responsibly the effects of alcohol and lack the legal capacity to
do so, logic dictates that their consumption of alcohol does not, as a matter of law . . . insulate one who provides alcohol to minors from liability
for ensuing injury. 70
Relying on the legislature's tacit acknowledgment that minors are
less capable than adults of recognizing the effects of consumption of
alcohol, the Ely court fashioned a common law remedy for injured parties against those who furnish intoxicating liquors to minors. 7 However, the Ely decision must not be construed as a total abrogation of
the common law rule of non-liability. On the contrary, the Ely court's
holding specifically applied to liability for the negligent acts of minors,
based upon the disability of minors, and not to adult guests, whom the
Connecticut court assumed could responsibly recognize the effects of
alcohol.72
In sum, the continued viability of the common law rule of absolute
immunity of social hosts is questionable, particularly in light of the
radical change in society since the inception of the rule. As the Georgia
Supreme Court has noted:
[T]he common law rule . . . arose before invention of the automobile.
Hence, many of the early cases involved injuries to the consumer of the
alcohol or crimes (e.g., murder, battery) committed by the consumer
while under the influence of alcohol, as opposed to negligence of the consumer in driving a vehicle resulting in injury to others. As Judge Cardozo said . . . 'Precedents drawn from the73days of travel by stagecoach
do not fit the conditions of travel to-day.'
C. Statutory Duty
Statutory prohibitions against furnishing alcohol to minors have
often served as a vehicle for courts to circumvent the harsh common

68. Id.
69. Id. at 90, 540 A.2d at 55-56.
70. Id. at 92, 540 A.2d at 58.
71. Id. at 91, 540 A.2d at 57.
72. Id.
73. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 195 n.3, 327 S.E.2d 716, 717 n.3 (1985) (citing
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916)).
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law rule of absolute immunity and impose liability upon social hosts for
the negligent acts of their intoxicated guests.7" A claim based upon ordinary negligence differs from one based on the violation of a statutory

prohibition against furnishing alcohol to minors." Under an ordinary
negligence theory of liability, the standard of care is that of a reasonable person under similar circumstances; the statute itself will provide
the standard of care when liability is predicated on negligence per se.7"
The mere fact that a legislature has proscribed the furnishing of
alcohol to minors does not necessarily signal that courts will impose
civil liability under the liquor control statute. Some courts have refused
to extend liability to social hosts under such statutes, holding that the
criminal statutes do not supply a civil cause of action. 7 7 On the other
hand, at least one court has imposed liability under a broad dram shop
act on a social host who furnished (as opposed to sold) alcohol to a
minor.7 8 The finding of a civil remedy under a liquor control statute
has hinged on the literal language of the statute for some courts. 9
Other courts have looked to the intent of the legislature in enacting the

74. See Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1157, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 684 (1985)
(liability is premised on the meaning of "furnish"); Sutter, 254 Ga. at 197, 327 S.E.2d at 719
(state statute forbidding the furnishing of alcohol to minor provides a statutory duty to protect
third parties); Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 674, 309 N.E.2d 150, 156 (1974) (social
host who gave alcohol to brother in violation of statute prohibiting furnishing of alcohol to minor
was held liable to injured third party. Court found no distinction between one who sells and one
who gives alcohol to minor); Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 10, 453
N.E.2d 430, 433 (1983) (sale of alcohol to minor is evidence of negligence); Thaut v. Finley, 50
Mich. App. 611, 613, 213 N.W.2d 820, 822 (1973); Walker v. Key, 101 N.M. 631, 635, 686 P.2d
973, 977 (1984) (statute prohibiting delivering alcohol to minor states a cause of action against
the social host). But see Strange v. Cabrol, 37 Cal. 3d 720, 722-23, 691 P.2d 1013, 1015-17, 209
Cal. Rptr. 347, 349 (1984) (liquor licensee who knowingly sold alcohol to minor in violation of
statute not liable to injured third party where other statute provided that furnishing alcoholic
beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication).
75. Special Project, supra note 1, at 1085.
76. Id. at 1086.
77. See United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Butler, 359 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1978); Holmes v. Circo,
196 Neb. 496, 500, 244 N.W.2d 65, 69-70 (1976) (in absence of legislation specifically providing
a civil remedy, tavern owner or operator is not liable to a third person injured by intoxicated
person to whom the tavern owner served liquor in violation of a liquor control statute); Yoscovitch
v. Wasson, 98 Nev. 250, 252, 645 P.2d 975, 976 (1982) (violation of a penal statute prohibiting
the sale of alcohol to minors is not negligence per se); Hulse v. Driver, I I Wash. App. 509, 512,
524 P.2d 255, 258 (1974) (civil liability will not be imposed solely on the basis of violation of
criminal statute prohibiting the supplying of liquor to minor).
78. Martin, 508 So. 2d at 1141.
79. See Butler, 359 So. 2d at 500 (holding statute prohibiting sale or gift of liquor to minors applied only to business establishments and did not create a civil cause of action against a
social host who dispensed liquor to minor); Ling v. Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 639-49, 703 P.2d
731, 739 (1985) (since statute prohibiting dispensing of alcoholic beverages to certain classes of
persons was intended to regulate sale of liquor and not to impose civil liability, a violation of such
a statute by
is not
negligence per
se).
Published
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statute to determine if a civil action is viable under the statute.8 0 In
Thaut v. Finley,8 1 the Michigan Court of Appeals succinctly stated the
logic of imposing liability on a social host who furnishes intoxicating
liquors to a minor in violation of a statute proscribing such activity.
The court stated:
[V]iolation of a statute is negligence per se if the statute was intended
to protect a class of persons, including the plaintiff, from the type of
harm which resulted from its violation. This is so, even though the statute does not contain a provision respecting civil liability ... it would be
absurd to maintain that one of the purposes of the statute in question
was not to protect the public from the risk of injury caused by intoxi82
cated minors.

Considering the Thaut court's broad application of the negligence
per se doctrine, it would be difficult to imagine, under any set of circumstances, where civil liability would not be imposed under such a
statute. It must be noted, however, that most courts have not been
amenable to such an all-inclusive interpretation of the negligence per se
doctrine, choosing instead to proceed cautiously in expanding social
host liability."

80. See Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 197, 327 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1985) (social host
owed duty to those using highways not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm by furnishing alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated person under legal drinking age and who hostess knew
would soon be driving, where legislative intent was to control drunk driving to protect those on
highways); Chausse v. Southland Corp., 400 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (La. 1981) (corporation that sold
beer to a minor in violation of a statute held liable to third parties for injuries because the purpose
of the statute was to place the entire responsibility upon person selling liquor to minor and to
protect minors from their own negligence by drinking), cert. denied, 404 So. 2d 278, cert. denied,
404 So. 2d 497, and cert. denied, 404 So. 2d 498 (1981); Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor,
Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 10-11, 453 N.E.2d 430, 434 (i983) (legislative objective in enacting liquor
control statute was to protect the public and minors); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213,
216 (Miss. 1979) (although statute prohibiting sale of beer to a minor was enacted for the regulation of the manufacture and sale of beer, it was also adopted for the protection of the public);
Walker v. Key, 101 N.M. 631, 634, 685 P.2d 973, 976 (1984) (liquor control statute was intended
to protect minors and to protect the general public from the risk of injury caused by intoxicated
minors).
81.

50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973).

82.

Id. at 613, 213 N.W.2d at 821-22.

83. See cases cited supra notes 79-80; see also Montgomery v. Orr, 130 Misc. 2d 807,
813-14, 498 N.Y.S.2d 968, 973 (1986) (proof of violation of statute is not negligence per se, but
is some evidence of negligence for the jury to consider; it is for the jury to determine the causal
relationship between the violation of the statute and the injury). But see Congini v. Portersville
Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 163 n.4, 470 A.2d 515, 518 n.4 (1983) (finding of negligence per se
merely satisfies plaintiffs burden of establishing defendant's negligent conduct; plaintiff still must
establish the injuries were the proximate result of the statutory violation).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/8
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D. Ohio Decisions
1. Common Law Rule of Absolute Social Host Immunity
The Ohio case law addressing social host liability is sparse. The
Ohio courts have adhered to the common law rule of absolute immunity of social hosts, as set out in Christoff v. Gradsky.8" In Christoff,
the defendant sold alcohol to an adult purchaser who was already so
intoxicated that he was unable to exercise-ordinary care, and whose
subsequent death allegedly resulted from such sale of alcohol.8 5 In affirming the common law rule of absolute immunity of social hosts, the
Christoff court held that, in the absence of an order of the department
of liquor control prohibiting the sale of alcohol to the decedent, a cause
of action does not lie because the common law gives no remedy for
injury or death that follows the mere sale of liquor to an ordinary
man. 86 However, perhaps recognizing the harsh effect the common law
rule has on injured third parties, the Ohio Supreme Court has fashioned two exceptions to the rule of absolute immunity of social hosts
for the negligent acts of their intoxicated guests.
2.

Two Exceptions

In the often cited case of Mason v. Roberts,8 7 the Ohio Supreme
Court articulated the possible exceptions to the common law rule of
absolute immunity of social hosts. The plaintiff in Mason brought a
wrongful death action against, among others, the owner of a tavern.
The suit alleged that employees of the tavern had served liquor to Roberts, who was already intoxicated, in violation of section 4301.22 of the
Ohio Revised Code8 8 which prohibits the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person. 9 Roberts thereafter assaulted plaintiffs decedent, another patron of the tavern, fatally injuring him."
The Mason court recognized that, at common law, a cause of action was not maintainable against one who sold or furnished intoxicating liquor to a person who, as a result of consuming such intoxicants,
caused injury to an innocent person."' The court noted that the common law principle presumed that "it was the consumption rather than

84. 140 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 1956).
85. Id. at 587.
86. Id. at 589.
87. 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
88. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4301.22 (Baldwin 1989).
89. Mason, 33 Ohio St. 2d at 30, 294 N.E.2d at 886. §4301.22 of the Ohio Revised Code
states, in pertinent part: "(B) No sales shall be made to an intoxicated person." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §4301.22 (B) (Baldwin 1989).
90. Mason, 33 Ohio St. 2d at 29, 294 N.E.2d at 885.
91. Id. at 33, 294 N.E.2d at 887.

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14:2

the sale which constituted the proximate cause of the harm done the
third party."9 2 Recognizing that the logic of the common law rule is
questionable, the Mason court articulated the following exceptions to
the rule: (1) the cause may be left for the jury where there is evidence
that, to the seller's knowledge, the will of the purchaser of alcohol was
so impaired as to have made it possible for the purchaser to refrain
from drinking, and (2) the sale of intoxicants may be determined to be
the proximate cause of subsequent harm to a third party when such
sale is contrary to statute.93 Thus, the Mason court extended, in a lim-

ited fashion, liability to social hosts for the negligent acts of their intoxicated guests. However, it must be recognized that the Mason court
addressed its exceptions to the sale of intoxicating liquors.
In keeping with the exceptions to the common law rule set out in
Mason, the Ohio Court of Appeals for Hamilton County extended liability to a social host for serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person
in Taggart v. Bitzenhofer.94 There, the defendant's employee continued
to serve alcohol to Michael Rohe, who was visibly intoxicated, after he
had displayed a pistol and threatened to kill Taggart.9 5 Shortly thereafter Rohe shot and killed Taggart.9" The Taggart court held that violation of section 4301.22 of the Ohio Revised Code,9 7 which prohibits the
sale of beer and intoxicating liquor to an intoxicated person, is negligence per se and such a violation creates a civil cause of action. 98 In
dicta, the Taggart court appears to have adopted the broad definition
of negligence per se that the Michigan Court of Appeals did in

92. Id.
93. Id. The Mason court also held that §4399.01 of the Ohio Revised Code, Ohio's Dram
Shop Act, does not provide the exclusive remedy against a liquor permit holder. Mason, 33 Ohio
St. 2d at 32, 294 N.E.2d at 887.
94. 35 Ohio App. 2d 23, 299 N.E.2d 901 (1972), affd per curiam, 33 Ohio St. 2d 35, 294
N.E.2d 266 (1973). Mason was decided by the court of appeals on the same day as Taggart. The
Ohio Supreme Court decisions were also issued contemporaneously.
95. Id. at 24, 299 N.E.2d at 902.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
98. Taggart, 35 Ohio App. 2d at 29, 299 N.E.2d at 904. See also Ono v. Applegate, 62
Haw. 131, 136, 612 P.2d 533, 538 (1980) (person injured by an inebriated driver may recover
from tavern which provided alcohol to driver in violation of statute prohibiting sale or service of
alcohol to person already under the influence of alcohol); Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v.
Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Ky. 1987) (dram shop operator could be held liable for furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person in violation of statute for death and personal injuries of third
parties); Cuevas v. Royal D'lberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 348 (Miss. 1986) (third party is
protected under beverage control statute prohibiting sale to visibly intoxicated person from negligent acts of intoxicated person, and has cause of action against one furnishing alcohol in violation
of such a statute); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 632, 651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (1982) (cause of
action for wrongful death is stated against liquor licensee who sold liquor to an intoxicated person,
in violation of statute, where server knew or should have known that customer was driving car and
where injury to third persons was a reasonably foreseeable result of driving while intoxicated).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/8

1989]

CASENOTE

Thaut.99 The Taggart court stated: "since a violation of a specific requirement of law constitutes negligence per se, it follows that ... [defendant], in selling alcohol to an intoxicated person failed to safeguard
the other patrons and was negligent and because that act was specifically forbidden by law, the sale constituted negligence per se." 1 0
The Ohio courts have not yet extended liability to a social host
under the first exception set out in Mason.'' In Baird v. Roach,
Inc.,10 2 the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, while "assuming
that the gratuitous serving of liquor to a social or business guest can
give rise to liability on the part of the host under Ohio law,' 0 3 nevertheless refused to impose liability on the defendant social host. 10 4 In
Baird, two employees of the defendant, Roach, Inc., attended Roach's
annual picnic where they were served and consumed intoxicating liquors. 10 5 The employees then left the picnic to drag race, where one or
both of their vehicles went left of the highway center colliding with the
automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger. 106 Noting that the
facts of the Baird case did not fit the Mason exceptions because the
complaint failed to allege such circumstances, 0 7 the Baird court stated:
Assuming that the gratuitous serving of liquor to a social or business
guest can give rise to liability on the part of the host under Ohio law,
such liability would be imposed only where the host knew that the person
to whom the liquor was furnished would consume it and either was, or
would become, intoxicated and would probably act in such a manner
while intoxicated as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to third
persons. o
If there were any doubts as to the extent to which the Ohio courts
would recognize exceptions to the common law rule of absolute immunity of social hosts, they were dispelled in the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veterans Post No. 49.109 In Settlemyer, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Wilmington Veterans
Post, gratuitously provided alcoholic beverages to Alice Berlin, and that
the defendant knew or should have known Berlin was intoxicated." 0

99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
100. Taggart, 35 Ohio App. 2d at 28, 299 N.E.2d at 904.
101. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102. 11 Ohio App. 3d 16, 462 N.E.2d 1229 (1983).
103. Id. at 19, 462 N.E.2d at 1233.
104. Id. at 16, 462 N.E.2d at 1230.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 18, 462 N.E.2d at 1232.
108. Id. at 19, 462 N.E.2d at 1233.
109. 11 Ohio St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d 521 (1984).
110. Id.
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The plaintiff further alleged that, as a proximate result of defendant's
negligence in providing liquor to Berlin, her vehicle collided with the
vehicle driven by the plaintiff's decedent, causing his death."'
The Settlemyer court recognized the common law rule of non-liability as extreme, "because in effect, it cloaked the providers of intoxicants with a blanket immunity from potential lawsuits."' 12 However,
the court noted that the wholesale abrogation of the common law rule
would also be extreme and "could open the door to unlimited liability
wherein a seller or provider could be placed in the situation of a veritable insurer of the alcohol recipient's misdeeds."'1 3 The Settlemyer
court, thus, was unwilling to completely abandon the common law rule
and open the door to the potential ramifications of sweeping social host
liability.
The Ohio Supreme Court distinguished the Settlemyer facts from
the Mason exceptions and found that a cause of action did not exist
against the Veterans Post." 4 The court held that Mason dealt with the
sale of intoxicating liquor by a commercial provider, whereas the Settlemyer case involved the gratuitous furnishing of alcohol by a social
host." 5 Further, the Settlemyer court found Mason inapplicable because of the absence of any statutory duty on the part of the defendant. 1 6 The court noted that no statute in Ohio precludes furnishing, as
opposed to selling, liquor to an intoxicated adult." 7
The Settlemyer court refused to expand the Mason exceptions and
create a cause of action for the plaintiff." 8 The court reasoned that a
social host who gratuitously furnishes alcohol to a guest should not be
held to the same standard as a commercial provider, who has a proprietary interest in providing alcohol, but who should be expected, because
of greater resources, to exercise greater control over patrons."' Finally,
the court in Settlemyer noted that any extension of liability of social
providers of intoxicating liquors should be left to the discretion of the

11l. Id. at 124, 464 N.E.2d at 522.
112. Id. at 125, 464 N.E.2d at 523.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 126, 464 N.E.2d at 523. Perhaps responding to the confusion created by the
Settlemyer decision, it was subsequently limited to its facts in Gressman v. McClain, 40 Ohio St.
3d 359, 351, 533 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1988), reh'g denied, 41 Ohio St.3d 723, 535 N.E.2d 315
(1988).
115. Settlemyer, II Ohio St. 3d at 126, 464 N.E.2d at 523.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 127, 464 N.E.2d at 524.
118. Id.
119. Id. But see Terry v. Markoff, 26 Ohio App. 3d 20, 22-23, 497 N.E.2d 1133, 1136
(1986) (a non-profit organization holding an Ohio liquor license, which provides alcohol on a payas-you-go basis, may be held liable to a patron who was assaulted by another patron who was
allegedly intoxicated, on the basis of violation of Ohio Revised Code §4301.22(B)).
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legislature.' 2 0

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Mitseff v. Wheeler... is
consistent with that court's refusal to completely abandon the common
law rule of absolute immunity of social hosts. Instead, the court loosely
relied on thie Mason v. Roberts"' exceptions in providing a remedy for
the plaintiff.
The defendant in Mitseff argued that he owed no duty to third
parties for damages resulting from his furnishing his guest with intoxicating liquors, based on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Settlemyer."' However, the court quickly distinguished Settlemyer from
the facts in Mitseff, stating, "Settlemyer concerned a social host providing alcohol to one who was apparently an adult guest, an act that is
not precluded by statute."' 24 Conversely, the defendant in Mitseff provided alcohol to a minor, in clear violation of section 4301.69 of the
Ohio Revised Code. 2 5 In very plain language, although citing no rationale for its finding, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute
creates a civil remedy for one injured by a minor who had been furnished alcohol in violation of statute, against the host providing the
alcohol.' 26
The logic of the Mitseff decision and the finding of a civil remedy
is unquestionable, in light of the precedents in Ohio. It cannot be said
that the decision will open the door to any sweeping extension of social
host liability in Ohio. On the contrary, the Mitseff court fit its decision
ioosely within the narrow exceptions to the common law rule set out in
Mason. While Mason discussed the sale of intoxicating liquors in violation of a statute, Mitseff is reconcilable with that exception in that the
statute at issue in Mitseff specifically precluded the sale or furnishing
of alcohol to minors. Further, the Taggart v. Bitzenhofer"'l court previously found that violation of a liquor control statute is negligence per
se. Therefore, the Mitseff finding of negligence per se is not surprising.
The fact that the statute at issue in Taggart applies to the sale of alcohol does not defeat the soundness of the Mitseff reasoning, which relied
on a statutory provision prohibiting the furnishing of alcohol to minors.

120. Settlemyer, II Ohio St. 3d at 127, 464 N.E.2d at 524.
121. 38 Ohio St. 3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798 (1988).
122. 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
123. Mitseff, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 112, 526 N.E.2d at 799.
124. Id. at 114, 526 N.E.2d at 800.
125. Id.
126. Mitseff, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 114, 526 N.E.2d at 800.
127. 35 Ohio App. 2d 23, 299 N.E.2d 901 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 33 Ohio St. 2d 35, 294
N.E.2d 266 (1973).

Published by eCommons, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

.[VOL. 14:2

Rather, the plaintiff in Mitseff was clearly within the class of persons
designed to be protected by the statute, particularly if the broad negligence per se rationale of the Michigan Court of Appeals in Thaut v.
Finley'2 8 was, as it appears, accepted by the Ohio courts in Taggart." ,
In a subsequent decision, the Ohio Supreme Court unequivocally stated
that the violation of a liquor control statute is negligence per se:
"[w]here a legislative enactment imposes a specific duty for the protection of others, a person's failure to observe that duty constitutes negligence per se."'13
It is readily apparent that the Ohio courts will exercise a great
deal of restraint in expanding the liability of social hosts; instead, they
will defer to the sound discretion of the legislature to provide remedies
for injured third parties. The Mitseff decision reflects the continued
deference of the Ohio courts to the authority of the Ohio legislature in
creating civil remedies for injured persons.
If there is any deficiency in the Mitseff decision, it is that the
court did not articulate its rationale when it found that the statute provided a civil remedy against those who furnish alcohol to minors. Instead, the court merely stated that "the statute created a duty that
appellee, because of Johnson's age, refrain from furnishing Johnson
with alcohol."1 31 A reader of the opinion, thus, cannot discern whether
the Ohio Supreme Court found a cause of action against social hosts
who provide alcohol to minors based upon legislative intent, public policy considerations, or upon the theory that the violation of any penal
statute creates a civil remedy. While the latter theory might signal
sweeping tort liability, it is unlikely that it was the sole basis for the
decision and such a theory should not be relied upon.
Considering that the Ohio courts have strictly adhered to the rationale of the Mason decision, it is more likely that the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision in Mitseff was predicated on Mason. In dictum, the
Mason court stated that the purpose of liquor control statutes is that
they "shall be liberally construed, to the end that the health, safety and
welfare of the people of this state shall be protected and temperance in
the consumption of alcoholic liquors fostered and promoted by sound
and careful control and regulation of their manufacture, sale and distribution."' 3 2 Therefore, applying the Mason rationale, the Mitseff court

128. 50 Mich. App. 611, 613, 213 N.W.2d 820, 822 (1973).
129. See supra notes 82 & 99 and accompanying text; see also Tomlinson v. McCutcheon,
554 F. Supp. 186, 189-90 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (a violation of Ohio's Dram Shop Act constitutes
negligence per se).
130. Gressman v. McClain, 40 Ohio St. 3d 359, 362, 533 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1988).
131. Mitseff, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 114, 526 N.E.2d at 800.
132. Mason, 33 Ohio St. 2d at 32, 294 N.E.2d at 887.
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may have liberally construed the statute at issue, finding that because
of the obvious legislative determination implicit in the statute that minors possess an inability to reasonably discern the effects of alcohol, a
civil remedy existed against one who furnishes alcohol in violation of
that statute. Given the utter silence of the Mitseff court as to the rationale for its decision, this theory cannot be presumed; however, it
would appear to be the most logical and well reasoned.
The legal effect of the Mitseff decision is to extend liability to social hosts in Ohio who furnish alcohol to minors in violation of Ohio
Revised Code section 4301.69, when the minor subsequently injures a
third party as a result of his or her intoxication. 3 The practical effect
of the decision is that hosts must absolutely refrain from furnishing or
providing alcohol to minors, under any circumstances, in order to avoid
being found liable in a civil action for damages resulting from the minor's negligent acts that are committed while intoxicated.
It is questionable whether liability will be extended to one who
unknowingly makes alcohol available to a minor, as opposed to directly
furnishing the alcohol to a minor. Such a situation is unlikely to result
in liability under the Mitseff decision because the statute may require
some affirmative action on the part of the host in order to constitute a
violation of the statute.13 ' However, at least one court has found a social host liable even where the host merely provided a "hospitable envi13 5
ronment" for consumption of alcohol by minors.
In MacLeary v. Hines, 3 ' the host did not physically give any alcohol to the minor, nor did the minor consume any alcohol the host made
available.1 3 7 Instead, the minor consumed alcohol he purchased himself."3 8 The MacLeary court extended social host liability beyond furnishing alcohol to minors in violation of statute, to those who intentionally aid minors in consuming liquor.1 39 The court held that a host

133. Mitseff, 38 Ohio St. 3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798.
134. See, e.g., Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1157, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 684
(1985) (the word "furnish" in the statute requires affirmative action on the part of the furnisher;
father who tacitly authorized son to furnish father's alcohol to minor guests committed an act of
misfeasance, which was affirmative conduct enough to conclude that father "furnished" alcohol to
minors); Christensen v. Parrish, 82 Mich. App. 409, 412, 266 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1978) (a social
host who did not supply alcohol consumed in her home, and who was not present when the minor
was served, does not have a common law duty to prevent others from furnishing alcohol to minors). But see Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1987) (social host can be liable when he
opens his premises for underage drinking, regardless of who purchased or furnished the alcohol).
135. Macleary, 817 F.2d at 1081 (applying Pennsylvania law).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1082.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1083 (citing Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987)).
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who knowingly and intentionally allows premises over which [the host
has control] to be used for the purposes of consumption of alcohol by
minors has created an unreasonable risk of intoxication of the minor
[and may therefore be liable for injuries if the jury finds] the use of the
premise to be a substantial factor in bringing about the intoxication of
the minor guest."'4
In light of the cautious approach of the Ohio courts in extending
social host liability, it is very questionable whether the MacLeary rationale would be accepted in Ohio. The continued cautious approach of
the Ohio courts is evident in a recent Ohio Supreme Court decision,Gressman v. McClain,14 ' where the court impliedly limited social host
liability in Ohio to cases where there has been a violation of some legislatively-mandated standard of conduct. 4
Although recent decisions do not indicate any clear national trend
in extending social host liability, the Mitseff decision is consistent with
the overall questioning of the common law rule of non-liability of social
hosts and the fashioning of alternative theories of recovery for injured
persons.
V.

CONCLUSION

Social host liability is a very perplexing area of tort law. While
some jurisdictions continue to adhere to the common law rule of nonliability of social hosts for the negligent acts of their intoxicated guests,
other jurisdictions, by fashioning remedies for injured parties based on
ordinary negligence principles or violation of liquor control acts, have
suggested that the common law rule is anachronistic in modern society.
The Ohio courts have proceeded cautiously in extending liability to
social hosts. In recognizing two possible exceptions to the common law
rule of non-liability of social hosts, as set forth in Mason v. Roberts,'"
the Ohio courts have fashioned a means of circumventing the harsh
effects of the rule without the wholesale abrogation of it. The Mitseff v.
Wheeler"' decision, in imposing liability on social hosts based on violation of Ohio's statute prohibiting the sale or furnishing of intoxicating
liquors to minors, signals the continued questioning of the common law
rule. Considering the cautious language of Mitseff and other Ohio decisions on social host liability, however, the complete abrogation of the
common law rule of absolute immunity of social hosts in Ohio is unlikely in the absence of action by the Ohio legislature, particularly

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
40
Id.
33
38

at 1081.
Ohio St. 3d 359, 533 N.E.2d 732 (1988).
at 362, 533 N.E.2d at 735.
Ohio St.2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
Ohio St.3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798 (1988).
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CASENOTE

1989]

given the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court found in Gressman v. McClain145 that social host liability must be based upon the violation of a
statutory norm. 14 The Mitseff decision signals that the Ohio courts
will continue to adhere to the Mason exceptions to the common law
rule of absolute immunity of social hosts, proceeding cautiously in expanding social host liability in Ohio.
Mary Katherine Huffman

145.
146.

40 Ohio St. 3d at 359, 533 N.E.2d at 732
Id. at 362, 533 N.E.2d at 735.
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